Who Deserves Police Restraint?
Social Threat and Attitudes Towards Protest Policing

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Abstract

Violations of fundamental democratic rights often have broad public support. What determines support for police repression in times of social protest? While previous research shows perceptions of protest violence increase support for repression, we argue that protests violating social norms are also seen as less deserving of restraint— even when they pose no physical threat. Focusing on gender-related protests, we test this argument using a survey experiment in Bogotá, Colombia, which like many cities in Latin America has repeatedly experienced women-led protests in recent years. Our results show that protests for LGBTQ+ rights and expanded abortion access reduce support for restraint compared to demands that are less threatening to the social order, even though perceptions of violence do not vary by protest goals. Non-violent protest tactics that violate traditional gender norms also reduce support for police restraint. These findings suggest that support for freedoms of assembly and speech—essential components of liberal democracy—is sensitive to the perceived normative subversiveness of protest demands and tactics.

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Introduction

According to data collected by the Varieties of Democracy Institute, as of 2024, the world has fewer democracies than autocracies for the first time in more than 20 years. Of the 45 countries that are becoming less democratic, 27 began their autocratization as democracies. 18 of these former democracies are now autocracies (Angiolillo et al. 2025). Such democratic backsliding occurs in incremental steps; it entails the gradual erosion of institutions and practices that protect and uphold political competition, participation, and accountability (Waldner and Lust 2018). Importantly, backsliding often occurs with the consent and support of ordinary people. Many autocratizing incuments remain popular. For example, despite years of autocratization, in 2017 three quarters of Turkish adults had a favorable view of Erdoğan (Ramones 2024). More broadly, studies of public attitudes regularly find that citizens in are often willing to trade off democratic values in favor of other considerations, such as partisanship, ideology, and leader competence (Graham and Svolik 2020; Frederiksen 2022; Gidengil, Stolle and Bergeton-Boutin 2022; Gidron et al. 2025).

However, we know little about the conditions under which ordinary people support violations of rights which are fundamental to democracy. We focus here on the violations of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly that occur during protest repression. These civil liberties constitute essential components of liberal democracy. Dahl (1971)'s classic formulation of the concept emphasizes two dimensions: contestation, which occurs when citizens can challenge the conduct of government, and participation, which concerns which members of the population have the right to engage in constestation. The ability of of citizens to come together to express, promote, and pursue their ideas collectively through protest is a crucial channel through which ordinary citizens engage in contestation. It also one that is, in practice, regularly restricted by agents of the state.

Police violence against protestors is a case in point, and state repression of protest in democracies has increased sharply over the past two decades (Castro 2024). Excessive police force in 2019 resulted in the deaths of at least 25 people in India who were protesting

a citizenship law which discriminates against Muslims (Human Rights Watch 2019). In Mexico, women's protests against gender violence in 2021 were met with harsh action by riot police using batons and tear gas (Abi-Habib and Lopez 2021; Berger 2021). During the political crisis in late 2022 in Peru, 49 protestors died as a result of police violence, principally through lethal ammunition fired at unarmed civilians (McDonald and Tiefenthaler 2023).

While protest repression sometimes elicits moral indignation and public backlash (Jasper 2014), harsh police tactics – like other violations of fundamental freedoms – frequently have public support (Caldeira 2002; González 2020; Laterzo 2024). For example, in many democracies, less than half of responsdents agree that those who criticize the government have a right to protest (Cassell 2020). Understanding which kinds of protests garner support for repression is therefore crucial to untangling support for democratic backsliding more broadly.

We argue that citizens are more willing to tolerate violations of the right to protest in the form of police repression where protesters' demands and/or tactics violate *social norms*, even when they pose no physical threat. Existing research has emphasized the extent to which real or perceived protest violence increases support for protest repression (Lupu and Wallace 2019; Muñoz and Anduiza 2019; Steinert-Threlkeld, Chan and Joo 2021; Williamson and Malik 2021; Manekin and Mitts 2022; Naunov 2025). In contrast, we contend that the social threat posed by protests, i.e. the extent to which they challenge the existing social order, is distinct from their actual or perceived physical threat. We test these arguments in the context of gender-related protests, and we argue that protests whose demands challenge traditional gender roles or in which protesters violate norms about appropriate behavior for women will be seen as less deserving of police restraint than those that do not.

We focus on gendered-related protests in Bogotá, Colombia. Like many cities around the globe, and in Latin America in particular, Bogotá has seen new waves of women-led activism in recent years. We rely on an original survey experiment among 1,003 adult residents of Bogota, fielded in person in January-February 2024, in which we present respondents with hypothetical protests with randomly varied characteristics. After describing each protest,

we ask respondents to rate the extent to which they agree that the police should stand back and not intervene.

We find that protests with goals that challenge the existing social order by undermining traditional gender norms—including those that demand reductions in discrimination against LGBTQ+ individuals or expanded access to abortion—are viewed as less deserving of police restraint than those that represent less of a challenge, including those demanding improvements in maternal healthcare or justice for victims of domestic violence. Violent protests are also viewed as less deserving of police restraint. Importantly, however, perceptions of how violent the protests are do not vary by protest goal. Moreover, non-violent protest tactics which violate norms of appropriate behavior for women, such as those in which female protesters go topless, are also viewed as more deserving of repression than protests entailing disruptive tactics which do not violate gendered norms, such as banging pots. We interpret these findings as suggesting that social threat has a powerful effect on attitudes towards the appropriateness of protest repression. We find little evidence to support a variety of alternative interpretations of our findings, including respondent ideology, protest violence, and protest effectiveness.

This study makes three contributions. First, the findings contribute to scholarship on democratic backsliding by identifying factors that increase toleration of violations of fundamental rights. While a large body of literature has documented the conditions under which citizens will endorse elements of democratic backsliding (Graham and Svolik 2020; Frederiksen 2022; Gidengil, Stolle and Bergeton-Boutin 2022; Wunsch, Jacob and Derksen 2025; Gidron et al. 2025), these existing studies have focused on legislative and judicial constraints on the executive, electoral institutions, and freedom of the press. In contrast, we consider violations of the rights to free speech and freedom of assembly. This focus is especially important to understanding democratic backsliding because protests have frequently played a pivotal role in halting autocratization (Riedl et al. 2024).

Second, the study contributes to scholarship on protest and social movement repression.

Despite a long tradition of scholarship in sociology and political science that views protest threat as multi-dimensional (Davenport 1995, 2000, 2007; Earl, Soule and McCarthy 2003; Earl and Soule 2006; Earl 2011), recent scholarship has focused more narrowly on physical threat in the form of real or perceived protest violence (Lupu and Wallace 2019; Muñoz and Anduiza 2019; Steinert-Threlkeld, Chan and Joo 2021; Williamson and Malik 2021; Edwards and Arnon 2021).[1] This valuable work has shown that the racial and ethnic identity of protesters shapes the degree to which they are perceived to be violent as well as the likelihood that their protests elicit police presence and repression (Davenport, Soule and Armstrong 2011; Rafail, Soule and McCarthy 2012; Manekin and Mitts 2022). In contrast, our findings demonstrate that, even among protests perceived as nonviolent, protest demands and tactics that challenge prevailing social norms *also* can be seen as deserving of repression.

Last, our findings contribute to scholarship on feminist and LGBT+ activism. Existing work emphasizes how the gender identity of protesters and ways in which they frame their demands shapes support for protest repression. Surveying Russian citizens, Naunov (2025) finds that female-dominated protests are viewed as less violent—and thus less deserving of repression–than male-dominated protests. Moreover, where female protesters frame their demands in feminist terms, rather than reinforcing their roles as mothers, they are less able to counter government propaganda that depicts them as violent. In contrast, our findings emphasize that the content of the demands being made and the use of non-violent but norm-violating tactics in pursuing them are also important determinants of attitudes towards the repression gender-related protests. More broadly, in highlighting the social threat gender-related protests can pose, these findings contribute to a growing body of scholarship on feminist and LGBTQ+ activism (e.g., Schneider 2008; Htun and Weldon 2012; Díez 2015; Anderson 2020; Corrales 2021) as well as on the backlash against it and subsequent emergence of new cleavages around religion and sexuality (Escoffier, Payne and Zulver 2023; Ayoub and Stoeckl 2024; Smith and Boas 2020).

[1]Similarly, work on public support for punitive policing (González 2020; Laterzo 2024) emphasizes the role of fear of crime and a desire for safety in prompting demand for such coercion.

Gendered Protests and Support for Police Restraint

A social order consists of the rules, norms, and practices that structure social life in a predictable way (North 2008; Lockwood 1994; Roberts 2013). As Parsons (1951/2013) clarifies, "it is the participation of an actor in a patterned interactive relationship which is for many purposes the most significant unit of the social system" (p. 15). Social orders can involve more or less strict gradations of class- or race-based hierarchies; similarly, they can be more patriarchal or more gender egalitarian. In any given social order, each person occupies a specific position relative to others and is expected to perform a certain role. Deviations from these expectations have the potential to undermine the existing status quo. We proceed from the assumption that, while all protests occur outside the formal channels of politics, such events vary in the extent to which they undermine prevailing societal norms.

We argue that, in the context of gender-related activism, deviations from traditional gender roles typically assigned to women will be seen as deserving of sanction—and less worthy of police restraint. So too will protests that are perceived to pose a threat to the physical security of citizens. These arguments resonate with work from moral psychology that suggests people condemn actions which violate moral norms (Cushman, Young and Hauser 2006; Graham et al. 2011; Schein and Gray 2018; Malle 2021). Political science research that focuses on violations of norms related to nonviolence shows that stronger perceived norm violations provoke more demand for punishment (García-Ponce, Young and Zeitzoff 2022). More broadly, research from lab experiments in a variety of contexts suggests that individuals are often willing to punish those who violate norms, even where such violations do not include committing physical harm (Fehr and Gächter 2000; Henrich et al. 2006). Extending this scholarship, we theorize about the impact of different types of norm violations in the context of gendered protest.

In the context of Latin America, we do not expect the reactions to protest events to align neatly with traditional social cleavages or left-right politics (Smith and Boas 2024). While those on the left are generally more supportive of gender equality, they may still perceive

some protests around gender issues to be more socially and/or physically threatening as a result of the demands, behavior, and identity of protesters. We also note that although the backlash against gender activism in Latin America in recent years has been largely a conservative one (Biroli and Caminotti 2020), many on the left have also opposed issues such as expanded abortion access and same-sex marriage. As Oviedo (2021, 42) describes, key actors in this backlash have included "right and left-wing leaders, Christian evangelical and Catholic representatives, and secular actors" alike.[2]

In the section that follows, we theorize about how protest goals, protest tactics, and the identity of protestors can shape perceptions of both the social and physical threat that a protest poses and, among with them, support for police restraint. While the specific protest attributes that we focus on in the theory are drawn from Colombia, we expect the core implications of our argument to be broadly applicable. We discuss the scope conditions in more detail below. A summary of our expectations regarding the physical and social threat posed by various protests is in Table A1, and a full list of hypotheses is in Table A2.

Protest Goals that Challenge Gender Norms

The goals of protests can challenge traditional gender norms in several ways. Demands to reduce maternal mortality place women in the role of mothers, supporters of children, and healthcare advocates. Such demands are thus compliant with the prevailing social order. In some respects, demanding justice for victims of domestic violence is likewise compatible with traditional views that priorize the protection of women and children. However, demanding accountability for domestic violence also requires challenging patriarchal norms of male domination over women. Indeed, domestic violence can be understood as "a cornerstone of male dominance as a substantive system" (MacKinnon 2011, p. 20). Globally, one in three women report having experienced physical or sexual violence by a current or former intimate

[2]For example, Rafael Correa, the left-wing former president of Ecuador, denounced "gender ideology" as destroying the family in one of his weekly radio programmes in 2013.

partner, or non-partner sexual violence (WHO 2021).[3] Most of this violence is "domestic" in the sense of being perpetrated by a former or current boyfriend, husband, or fiancé (WHO 2021). At the same time, domestic violence is often perceived as a "private" matter which is for families, not the government, to address (MacKinnon 2007; Lindsey 2022). Women challenging such violence are thus deviating from their stereotypical roles as subservient to men and as keeping family issues at home "where they belong." As Zulver (2022) argues, women who make claims for gender justice are "transgressing socially acceptable gender norms by making demands for women's rights" (p. 5). We thus expect that protests that demand justice for victims of domestic violence will been seen as more deserving of police intervention than those that demand improvements in maternal health care.

Even more starkly challenging to the gender-based social order are demands for expanded access to abortion and LGBTQ+ rights. The right and access to safe and legal abortion remains a deeply polarizing subject in many regions and countries around the globe, including the United States (e.g., Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Cook 2019) and Latin America (e.g. Htun 2003; Anderson 2020; Smith and Boas 2024). Opponents of abortion often characterize it as antithetical to women's most important and sacred role – motherhood –and the protection of the unborn (Luker 1985; Cook 2019; Daby and Moseley 2022; Escoffier and Vivaldi 2023). In Latin America, limits on abortion access continue because of the influence of the Catholic church as well as widespread public opposition to or ambivalence about the procedure (Htun 2003; Blofield and Ewig 2017; Anderson 2020). In Colombia specifically, abortion has been decriminalized under the most progressive legal framework in the region since 2022, yet legal ambiguities persist, access is uneven throughout the country, and stigmatization remains high (Tamés and Albarracín-Caballero 2023; Maracani and Salomón 2024).

Similarly, the demand for sexuality- and gender-inclusive policies is often framed by anti-rights groups as a direct, existential threat to the family (Smith and Boas 2024; Ritholz and Mesquita 2023; Escoffier, Payne and Zulver 2023). The family that conforms with

[3]Moreover, a third of intentional homicides of women and girls worldwide are committed by an intimate partner (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 2019).

constructions of heteronormativity is a hallmark of the traditional gender order and, from that perspective, destabilizing its dominant place in society constitutes a major social threat. Indeed, mobilization and countermobilization on issues surrounding LGBTQ+ and abortion rights have led to a new cleavage in Latin America, pitting progressive activists and voters on one side and defenders of the traditional social order on the other (Mayka and Smith 2021). We thus argue that both protests advocating increased abortion access and those seeking an expansions of LGBTQ+ rights present a greater social threat than protests demanding reductions in maternal mortality or justice for victims of domestic violence. As a result, we expect less support for police restraint in the face of them.

Behaviorally Transgressive Protests Tactics

The use of violent tactics by women subverts expectations about women as peaceful, socially oriented, and caring (e.g. Sanbonmatsu 2002; Getry and Sjoberg 2015; Ellemers 2018). Protest tactics that restrict the physical movement of bystanders, such as blocking traffic, violate traditional gender norms that portray "good" women as unobstructive. In addition to this subversion of social expectations, blockages may generate fear among bystanders and pose a physical risk (Chenoweth 2021). Manekin and Mitts (2022), for example, show that traffic blockages increase the likelihood that protests will be perceived as violent compared to marches that do not impede traffic. The use of overtly violent protest tactics, such as throwing rocks, is even more socially transgressive and even more threatening to the safety of those nearby than blocking traffic.

Protest tactics can also transgress social norms without posing any physical threat. For example, nudity is used in protests in a variety of ways, including to highlight the shared vulnerability of human bodies to the harms being protested, convey the strength of protesters' convictions, and provoke bystanders into paying attention to protesters and their demands (Alaimo 2010; Tobocman, Brownhill and Turner 2021).[4] Cultural norms that view female

[4]While nudity has been used prominently in feminist protest movements, it is not confined to them or to protests around women's issues broadly. Demonstrations of nudity have been staged by groups advocating for world peace, environmental protections, improvements in animal welfare, genetically modified foods, and

nudity as immodest and inappropriate may provoke anger against protesters that employ it (Weaver 2013). While unrelated to any threats of violence, women exposing their breasts in public very deliberately violates social norms.

In comparison, the banging of pots and pans is a protest tactic is not particularly disruptive to people's daily routines or physically threatening; it is also one that coheres with traditional gender identities. As Power (2010) describes in the context of right-wing women protesting against Allende in Chile, "The banging of the pots and pans was an ideal form of protest for many women. The utensils were both familiar and accessible to them...The activity did not challenge their identity as mothers whose primary responsibility was to their children; in fact, it confirmed it" (p. 190) As a result, we expect that protests in which women block traffic will be seen as less deserving of police restraint, compared to those in which they bang pots; protests in which women go topless or throw rocks, which represent more extreme violations of the social order, will be seen as even less deserving.

Protester and Leader Identity

Recent scholarship emphasizes the importance of ethnic and gender identity in shaping perceptions of protest violence (Manekin and Mitts 2022; Naunov 2025). Yet we argue that the relationship between protester identity and attitudes towards police violence is more complex. On the one hand, women are viewed as less physically threatening than men. Thus, protesters comprised primarily of women may be viewed as less dangerous than a mixed group that includes men, no matter what tactics are used. Moreover, violence against women is more heavily stigmatized than violence against men (e.g. Pickett, Mancini and Mears 2013; Dow et al. 2023). Therefore, we hypothesize that there will be more support for police restraint in response to women's protests than in response to protests that include both men and women.

On the other hand, widespread attitudes towards women, which relegate their place to the private sphere, undermine their legitimacy as political actors. Women who resist patriarchal

many other issues without a gender focus (Weaver 2013).

conceptions of femininity by participating in protests may no longer benefit from the "gender shield" effect in opposition to repression of female protesters (Naunov 2025). Moreover, the presence of men within a protest can signal that is has more social acceptance, and thus presents less of threat to the social order, than women's protests. For example, a qualitative study comparing Women in Black, an all-female Israeli-Jewish protest movement, to The 21st Year, a mixed-gender movement with similar goals and tactics, concluded that the latter was more succesful because the presence of men signalled that it could be "assimilated by the sociopolitical order without being perceived as a challenge or a threat" (Sasson-Levy and Rapoport 2003, 398). More generally, protests movements that build broader, more socially diverse coalitions tend to be more effective (Dahlum 2023). As a result, we also test a competing hypothesis about the effect of the gender identity of protesters on support for police restraint: compared to women's protests, those with a mix of men and women will receive more support for police restraint.

In addition to the general composition, the organizational affiliations of protest leaders may affect views on police repression and restraint.[5] We focus on three particularly common typs of affiliations in the context in which we work: with women's organizations, armed groups, and political parties. Like women protestors more generally, public-facing women's organizations, which advocate for political change, can be seen as a deviation from traditional gender roles. Yet women's organizations often lack the institutional capital and influence that other other types of civil society organizations have. Due to the frequent association of women's organizations with demands surrounding 'mundane' or 'private' issues, they may be taken less seriously in general (Marx Ferree 2004). More generally, female leaders are generally seen as less competent in the political sphere and held to higher standards (e.g. Holman, Merolla and Zechmeister 2022; Bauer 2020).

Other types of organizational affiliations can affect support for police repression and

[5]Financial and organization support reduces the costs of collective mobilization (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978; Murdie and Bhasin 2011; Murdie and Peksen 2015); as a result, protests often involve a wide array of organized political and civil-society groups.

restraint via changing perceptions of physical threat rather than, or in addition to, social threat. The most stark example is affiliation with armed groups.[6] We expect the real or implied affiliation between protesters and armed actors will signal the potential for escalations of conflict and violence, and thus reduce support for police restraint (Lupu and Wallace 2019; Muñoz and Anduiza 2019; Steinert-Threlkeld, Chan and Joo 2021; Manekin and Mitts 2022). Finally, while political parties are typically associated with nonviolent, mainstream politics, they may also be involved in armed politics in countries affected by political violence, for example via – overt or covert – alliances with or support from armed groups (Matanock and Staniland 2018; Daly 2022; Steele and Schubiger 2018).[7] This is the case in the context of Colombia, as well as in many other post-conflict settings.

Following this discussion, we test three hypotheses about protest leadership and support for police restraint. We expect protests in which leaders have ties to an armed group will receive less support for police restraint in response than those in which leaders have ties to either political parties or women's organizations. However, we have competing expectations about women's organizations in relation to political parties – political parties, which are part of the established political process, pose less of a social threat, but are potentially associated with violence, while leadership in women's organizations presents less of a physical threat but more of a deviation from women's 'natural' roles. As a result, we test the hypothesis that protests in which leaders have ties to women's organizations will receive *less* support for police restraint compared to protests in which leaders have ties to political parties against the competing hypothesis that they will receive *more* support.

[6]Such affiliations are common. For example, in March of 2021 in Myanmar, three rebel groups linked themselves to anti-coup protesters, saying that they would "cooperate with the protesters and fight back" (*Al Jazeera* 2021). Krtsch (2021) shows that armed groups sometimes employ general strikes to signal authority to the local population, using Eastern India as a case study.

[7]Some armed groups participate directly in elections, forming their own political parties and running candidates. Others covertly control formal political parties or support established parties indirectly (Matanock and Staniland 2018).

Summary of Expectations

In summary, we argue that perceptions of both physical and social threats will shape support for protest restraint. Table A1 summarizes our expectations about the physical and social threat posed by each protest attribute, and Table A2 contains a full list of hypotheses. We emphasize that the level of physical and social threat associated with particular demands, tactics, and protester identities should be viewed in relative terms within each category. We do not argue, for example that disrupting traffic should be interpreted to pose the same "level" of social threat as demanding justice for victims of domestic violence; rather, it poses more of a social threat than banging pots and less of a social threat than going topless or throwing rocks.

Scope Conditions

The ways in which social threat manifest in specific protest tactics, affiliations, and demands is likely to differ across country contexts. However, we note that backlash against gender-related activism can occur in more liberal and gender-traditionalist contexts alike. Indeed, in recent years many countries that have seen expansions in gender equality and LGBTQ+ rights have also seen concurrent counter-mobilizations.[8] As a result, we expect the broader arguments we develop about the role of social threat to hold in many contexts outside of Colombia and Latin America more generally in which freedom of assembly is guaranteed by law, even if not entirely in practice. They are likely to be most salient in urban environments in which most protests action occurs.

Research Design

Protest in Latin America and Colombia

We test our arguments Bogotá, Colombia, which bears resemblence to urban areas in many other countries that have seen protests around gender-related issues in recent decades.

[8]For example, despite ranking among the most gender-equal societies globally, Nordic countries such Denmark and Sweden have not been immune to rising expressions of sexism among youth in particular (Off, Charron and Alexander 2022).

Citizens throughout Latin America frequently take to the streets in order to express their opinions. For example, between June 1st, 2023 and June 1st, 2024, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) program recorded 20,072 protest events in Latin America and the Caribbean. 311 of these protests involved some form of state intervention against protesters. During this same time period, Colombia alone had 1,872 protest events registered by ACLED (ACLED 2024).

Colombians have the constitutional right to protest (Mundo 2020), and a wide array of citizens choose to do so. In recent years, there have been protests in Colombia in favor of abortion, LGBTQ+ rights, and an end to violence against women (e.g. Turkewitz 2022; Mercado 2023; Redacción Judicial 2024). Protests often reach into the tens of thousands, and there are sometimes counterprotests on the same day (e.g. Redacción Bogotá 2024*c*,*a*). Colombian protests often involve many different participants and tactics. For example, the national strike that began in November 2019 to protest a proposed tax reform has been described as follows: "The flags of over fifty trade unions waved above the walking crowds. Topless protestors posed for photographs. People in traditional indigenous clothes played music and danced in a circle. Fireworks went off" (CassandraVoices 2019).

Common tactics include cacerolazos (the banging of pots) and the disruption of traffic (e.g. Otis 2019; Redacción Bogotá 2024*d*; Janetsky 2019; Leal 2020; Pantoja, Goubert and Ospina 2021). Protesters sometimes use physical force (e.g. Redacción Politica 2022; Redacción Bogotá 2024*b*) or remove their shirts (e.g. Caracol Radio 2013; Redacción Nacional 2021). These protests have led to legal change over the past decade. Indeed, Colombia's laws are more progressive than those of many countries in the region; Colombia legalized gay marriage in 2016 and adopted some of the most liberal abortion laws in the region in 2022 (Duran 2016; González-Vélez and Jaramillo-Sierra 2023; Otis 2022).

Both peaceful and violent protesters in Colombia are sometimes faced with state repression. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights was able to verify 46 protesters killed by state forces during the national strikes that began in April of 2021 as well as 16 cases

of sexual violence committed by the national police; they indicated that there was ample evidence that "there were grave violations of human rights" (Oficina del Alto Comisionado de Derechos Humanos 2022). 22% of the 191 cases of police violence in Colombia from August 2022 to July 2023 that civil society group Temblores has documented occurred in the context of protest (Indepaz and Temblores 2023). Importantly, protests relating to gender are not exempt from police brutality (Redacción Género y Diversidad 2024). In response to accusations of police brutality surrounding the 2021 national strike, the Colombian government argued that the protests had been infiltrated by organized non-state armed actors (Acosta 2021).

Survey Sampling

We test our hypotheses on a face-to-face survey that we fielded across Bogotá, Colombia's capital, between January 15th and February 24th of 2024 via the survey firm *Soluciones Estratégicas en Información* (SEI). We chose to field a face-to-face survey as this enabled us pursue a more rigorous sampling strategy than an online survey would allow. Our survey received institutional review board approval from three universities.[9] In total, we collected data from 1,003 respondents. Unless otherwise noted, all sampling and design decisions were specified in the pre-analysis plan.[10]

In the sampling protocol, we stratified by locality; there are 19 urban localities within Bogotá, and their borders are defined by the city's government. Blocks are the smallest geographic units above the household in the Colombian census, and the number of blocks selected in each locality was proportional to the locality's projected 2023 population according to Colombia's census agency (DANE). Within each locality, we also stratified by the size of blocks. Blocks were selected randomly within each block-size strata. In each selected block, survey enumerators determined the number of inhabited dwellings and obtained descriptive information necessary to identify each dwelling at later stages of sampling. They did so by

[9] Detailsn redacted for anonymity.

[10] Available at https://osf.io/4rtb8/?view˙only=009ea04c8c574c8ab82e7d5a3adbf650.

observation, without knocking on anyone's door.[11] Enumerators also determined the modal socioeconomic level of the block; there are 6 official categorizations in Colombia, and an individual's socioeconomic level is defined by the materials out of which their dwelling is constructed.

Enumerators then knocked on the doors of each selected dwellings in order to list the number of households within the dwelling. If there was more than one household within the dwelling, one would be randomly selected. The enumerator would then compile a list of eligible household residents by asking how many people over the age of 18 make up the household. For each of these individuals, the enumerator recorded the relationship with the head of household, the age, and the sex. A respondent was then randomly selected; men were selected with a greater likelihood than women because women are more frequently at home in Colombia. If individual selected to respond to the survey was not at home, the enumerator made three subsequent attempts.[12]

Experimental Design

We utilize a conjoint experimental design (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto 2014; Hainmueller, Hangartner and Yamamoto 2015). In this survey, respondents are presented with 6 protests; the levels of all attributes are varied randomly in each protest. Before reading about the first protest, respondents read the prompt below. The prompt emphasizes that we are asking about hypothetical protests to reduce the sensitivity of the question.[13] The conjoint attributes and levels are presented in Table 1.

> I am going to present you with information about six IMAGINARY protests taking place at the Plaza de Bolívar, in front of Congress. Imagine that several

[11] If there were more than 80 dwellings within a block, the enumerator collected details about only a random portion of the block's dwellings. For example, if there were eight floors of equal size, two floors may be selected.

[12] If the enumerator was unable to reach the selected individual, the individual was not replaced with anyone else in the same block. Similarly, if a dwelling, household, or individual rejects participation or could not be surveyed for any other reason, they were not replaced. Only blocks were replaced. For more details regarding replacement and other elements of sampling, see Appendix B.

[13] Recent work suggests that informing respondents that a scenario is hypothetical does not significantly affect their responses (Brutger et al. 2023).

hundred people attend each of these protests. After I describe each FICTITIOUS protest, I will ask you some questions about each protest and how you think the police should respond to them. Even if you are not sure of your responses, please try your best to answer my questions as if the protests were real.

Table 1: Conjoint Details

Attribute	**Levels**
The protesters want	Improvement in maternal health care Justice for victims of domestic violence Reduction in discrimination against LGBTQ+ individuals Improved access to safe and legal abortion for all women
Who is participating	Mostly women A mix of men and women
Who is leading	Some leaders have alleged ties to a political party Some leaders have alleged ties to a women's organization Some leaders have alleged ties to an armed group
Protester tactics	Many women are banging pots Many women are disrupting traffic Many women are going topless Many women are throwing rocks

Following the presentation of each protests, respondents were asked to rate the protest in terms of the appropriate police response. More precisely, respondents were asked "Please tell me, on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 is 'completely disagree' and 7 is 'completely agree,' to what extent do you agree with the following statement: 'The police should stand back and not intervene in this protest?'"

Our principal quantity of interest is the average marginal component effect (AMCE) (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto 2014). The AMCEs can be interpreted as the change in approval of the police standing back (on a 1-7 scale) if a protest has a particular level of that attribute, relative to the baseline level of an attribute. Additionally, we rely on marginal means and omnibus F-tests when testing for differences across respondent subgroups (Leeper, Hobolt and Tilley 2022). Marginal means can be interpreted as the average level of support for the police standing back (on a 1-7 scale) for a given level of an attribute. Across both kinds of analyses, the unit of analysis is a hypothetical protest. Standard errors are clustered by respondent.

It is important to validate our assumptions about which attribute levels are more or less physically threatening, especially because some scholars have argued that people support police repression of nonviolent protesters by ethnic minorities because they perceive such protesters as violent (Manekin and Mitts 2022). Therefore, following the sixth protest, we also asked respondents how violent they perceived that protest to be (not violent, somewhat violent, or very violent) and how likely they thought it was to achieve its goals (not likely, somewhat likely, or very likely). In a battery of questions following the conjoint, we also included questions concerning ideology, victimization, political engagement, and more. We asked respondents to place their political ideology on a 10-point left-right scale, as well as the rate their level of agreement with each of the different protest demands that the experiment varied.

Confidentiality and Identifiable Information

We took take several approaches to protect participant privacy. First, we conducted surveys in individual homes instead of in public areas. Second, the use of the conjoint experiment largely prevented anyone who may have overheard an individual's response from discerning which attribute of the protest caused the respondent to either approve of or object to police inaction. Third, respondents coukd skip any question with which they are uncomfortable.

We also sought to maintain confidentiality to the maximum extent possible. Responses were collected on tablets, enumerators had to enter a master key to access or modify any data, and the collected data was automatically encrypted and stored on a secure server. We considered audio recordings which were randomly collected for quality control purposes, information about individuals' relationships within a household, and all address information below the level of the locality to be individually identifiable information.[14] Only senior SEI staff had access to the full dataset with identifiable information. SEI delivered a de-identified version of the dataset to the researchers and subsequently deleted all identifiable information.

[14] Audio recording began only once informed consent has been obtained and was deleted following quality checks, no later than two months following the end of data collection. A random portion of every respondent's participation was recorded. Respondents received notebooks and pens to thank them for their time.

Results

Figure 1 presents our main results.[15] We plot the AMCEs, or more specifically the coefficients from linear regressions, where the outcome variable — support for police restraint — is regressed on the randomly varied protest attributes, with one attribute level serving as the baseline. We also plot the 95% confidence intervals. Dots without confidence intervals represent the baseline category.[16]

Our findings are in line with the notion that protest characteristics associated with either a larger physical *or* social threat reduce support for police restraint. We have argued that demands vary by social threat, from low (improvement in maternal health), to moderate (accountability for domestic violence), to high (demands for greater abortion access and reductions in discrimination against LGBTQ+ individuals). As Figure 1 shows, compared to protests which demand improvements in maternal health, demands for justice for victims of domestic violence do not reduce support for police restraint significantly. However, in line with our argument, demanding a reduction in discrimination against LGBTQ+ individuals and increased access to abortion reduces endorsements of police restraint by .265 (95% CI=-.419, -.111) and .200 (-.365, -.035) points, respectively, on a 7 point scale.[17]

Turning to the composition of the protests, we find no indication that the gender make-up of protests (men and women or mostly women) affects support for police restraint (see Figure 1). We had developed competing hypotheses about protest composition because we

[15]Table A6 is the corresponding table. Unless otherwise noted, statistical significance refers to p-values less than .05.

[16]Randomization was successful (Table A8), although we do find that respondents answered somewhat differently depending on which of the six tasks they were engaging in (Table A10; Figure A2). The results are robust to removing respondents who the enumerators classified as "unengaged" (Figure A3), including weights based on gender (Figure A4), converting the dependent variable into a binary one (A5), and multiple testing adjustments (Table A9). Two exceptions are noted below. The responses to any given attribute do not vary greatly depending on which other attribute levels are presented to respondents (Figure A12). For analyses of subgroup heterogeneity, see Section F.

[17]Compared to protests demanding justice for domestic violence, protests which demand a reduction in discrimination against LGBTQ+ people reduce support for police restraint by .149 points (-.307, .008), although this result is only significant to the p<.1 level (Table A7). The results on abortion access are robust to some but not all multiple inference adjustments; results on other protest demands are robust to all (see Table A9).

Figure 1: Main Results



anticipated that configuration might affect attitudes towards repression in two distinct ways. First, because female protesters may be viewed as less physically threatening than a gender mixed crowd, and because violence against woment is stigmatized, restraint against female protesters may be warrented. Second, and alternatively, women protesting without men may be seen as more norm violating, and thus less deserving of such restraint.

Figure 2 lends supports to these arguments. It presents the results of a linear regression of the perceived level of violence (not violent, somewhat violent, or very violent) and likelihood of protest success (not likely to achieve its goals, somewhat likely, and very likely) on the

conjoint levels.[18] These questions were asked following the third task, and they inquire about the last presented protest. In particular, we note that protests with a mix of men and women are assumed to be more violent than those mostly female protesters. Yet, this does not translate into more support for protest repression (or less support for police restraint). As a result, one interpretation could be that the effects of social and physical threat are counteracting each other, with neither outweighing the other. At the same time, we do not find that gender-mixed protests are viewed as any more likely to succeed than those comprised of all women– a somewhat surprising finding given that we had anticipated the presence of men to signal broader social acceptance of the protest, and thus higher efficacy. It may be that in Latin America, where womens' movements countering authoritan regimes have been seen as quite succesful (Waylen 1993), the presence of men sends a weaker signal about efficacy.

In terms of the affiliations of protest leaders, we find that, compared to protests in which leaders have ties to political parties, connections to women's organizations have no effect on support for police restraint. Links to armed groups, however, reduce support for restraint by .361 points (-.498, -.225). Similarly, relative to links to a women's organization, ties to an armed group reduce support for police restraint by .454 points (-.593, -.315).[19]

Finally, we find support for our hypotheses about the effect of protest tactics on approval for police restraint. As expected, Figure 1 shows that behavior that is disruptive or violent reduces support for restraint. Relative to banging on pots, interrupting traffic reduces ratings of police restraint by .677 points (-.843, -.511). Throwing rocks reduces support for restraint by 1.390 (-1.572, -1.218) points, compared to banging pots.[20] Figure 2 shows that, as expected, these protest tactics are viewed as significantly more violent than banging pots and pans. Yet, physical threat is not the only factor that matters in assessing how protest tactics affect support for police restraint. Strikingly, compared to banging pots,

[18]For quantitative results, see Table A12.

[19]See Table A7.

[20]Compared to throwing rocks, banging pots, disrupting traffic, or going topless all increase support for police restraint, as hypothesized (Figure A1 and Table A7).

Figure 2: Assumptions about Protests by Attribute Level



women protestors going topless reduces approval for restraint by .295 points (-.450, -.139).[21] In other words, in considering how the police should respond to a range of protester tactics, people are integrating not just violence but also normative assessments into their judgements.

Alternative Explanations

We discuss here three alternative explanations for our findings regarding social threat: that the results are driven by perceptions of violence, beliefs about the likelihood of success, or left-right ideology. In doing so, we focus on the results indicating that protest demands

[21]This finding is robust to removing unengaged respondents, using a binary dependent variable, but not to including gender-based weights (see Figures A3,A4, and A5, as well as Table A9).

and tactics shape support for police restraint because these results enable us to most clearly distinguish between social and physical threats.[22] The evidence indicates that it is unlikely that these alternative arguments satisfactorily explain the results.

First, it is possible that attribute levels conceptualized as socially threatening are actually perceived as physically threatening; if so, social threat works through physical threat. Yet as Figure 2 indicates, none of the protest demands are statistically signficant predictors of how violent the protests are thought to be; this suggests that the effect of demands on protest repression are not operating through physical threat. Similarly, protests in which women go topless are not perceived as more violent than protests which involve banging pots.

The second alternative explanation for the findings is that social threat works through perceptions of the likelihood of success. Indeed, a protest which challenges the status quo may be seen as unlikely to garner widespread support and thus unlikely to succeed.[23] Figure 2 demonstrates that views of the likelihood that protesters will achieve their aims does not vary by protest demand or by protest tactic.

Finally, it may be that our results on protest demands and tactics capture left-right ideological cleavages rather than social threat. We do find that support for police restraint varies significantly when we place resondents into ideological subgroups, with more right-wing respondents being less supportive of restraint (Figure A8).[24] Right-wing respondents also distinguish between protests which demand improvements in maternal health and those which seek improved abortion access (Table A11).

Yet, if our findings were merely a reflection of left-right ideological cleavages, we would expect more systematic differences between social-threat-related attribute levels among right-

[22]While we pre-registered exploratory analyses regarding heterogeneous treatment effects by ideology, the other analyses in this section were not pre-registered.

[23]Existing scholarship has found that larger, more diverse, non-violent protests campaigns tend to be more effective in achieving concessions (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Chenoweth and Cunningham 2023; Dahlum 2023); subnationally, higher capacity states are more likely to offer concesssions in the face of nonrevolutionary protest (Sullivan 2024). However, the protest literature remains primarily focsed on protest initiation, rather than outcome, and we know relatively little about what drives public perceptions about likely success.

[24]We divided our ten-point ideology scale into left-right and left-center-right; for the latter, we defined the center-category in two different ways (4-7 vs. 5-6).

wing respondents than left-wing respondents. However, there are no other significant differences in the effects of protest demands, regardless of whether respondents are left, center, or right-wing ideologically. We also do not find differences in effects between banging pots and going topless to be significant only or primarily among right-wing respondents. Rather, depending on how we group the responses on the 10-point ideology scale, the difference between banging pots and going topless remains significant for more centrist or more leftist respondents (Table A11).

Moreover, even people who agree with the protest demands penalize women for behaving in transgressive ways. Those who agree with various demands distinguish between banging pots and going topless, though some of the differences are only significant to the $p<.1$ level (Table A11). Figure A12 also demonstrates that, regardless of the demand being made by protesters, protest tactics shape support for police restraint. Importantly, perceptions of protest success and violence are also not driven by ideology (Table A13). These findings are in line with recent work demonstrating the extent to which the effect of ideology on attitudes towards punitive policing can be moderated by other factors (Laterzo 2024). They also resonate with research underlining the departure of "sexuality politics" from traditional political cleavages (Smith and Boas 2024).

Discussion and Conclusion

Police repression of protests remains common in democracies, even though the rights to collective assembly and free speech are central to democratic political contestation. Prior research shows that support for such repression is tied to actual or perceived protester violence. Yet protests can also threaten the social status quo, separate from any physical threat they might pose. We show that protests with more socially transgressive goals, specifically those that demand reductions in discrimination against LGBTQ+ individuals or expanded access to abortion, are indeed evaluated as less deserving of police restraint than those that demand improvements in maternal healthcare or justice for victims of domestic violence. We also find support for the argument that protest tactics that violate

gender-related social norms, in addition to those that are disruptive or violent, reduce support for police restraint. Protests in which women go topless, disrupt traffic, or throw rocks are all evaluated as less deserving of police restraint than those in which women bang pots. Importantly, these findings are not explained by respondent differences in ideological orientation. While right-wing respondents are more prone to condone repression, the effects we identify apply across the ideological spectrum. Left- and right-wing respondents alike punish female protesters for transgressive behavior. In short, our findings suggest that the right to peacefully protest, even though an essential component of liberal democracy, is unevenly supported and sensitive to the perceived normative subversiveness of protest tactics and demands.

While we study the social threat presented by gender-related protests, we expect the arguments to hold in protests which challenge the status quo in other ways. Future research could assess the transgression of religious or cultural norms, or whether the ethnic identity of protestors moderates the impact of gendered infringements. As more fine-grained protest data becomes available, future extensions could also model the presented protest characteristics on real-world distributions (de la Cuesta, Egami and Imai 2022), thus improving external validity. Other avenues for future work include the unpacking of our surprising finding that none of the protest attributes seems to be correlated with perceived protest success. It is possible that, at least in our context, gender-based protests tend to be perceived as unlikely to succeed due to the persistence of patriarchal attitudes. Or perhaps the multitude of potential movement outcomes and the varied interpretations associated with protest success explain the lack of these effects (Turner 2023; Chenoweth and Cunningham 2023).

In the context of increasing autocratization, understanding the conditions that fuel support for democratic backsliding is acutely relevant. We show that constituencies may support the erosion of democratic rights even in the absence of a physical threat.

Compliance with Ethical Standards

This research was funded by a grant from the U.S. National Science Foundation (Award XXXX [removed for peer review]). The authors declare no competing interests. This study received Institutional Review Board approval at three institutions [details removed for peer review]. Informed consent was obtained from all individual participants in the study.

Data Availability

Replication materials will be made available on the Harvard Dataverse site.

Supplementary Material

Supplementary material for this article will be available at XXXXX.

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Supplementary Appendices for Who Deserves Police Restraint? Social Threat and Attitudes Towards Protest Policing

Contents

A Summary of Expectations and Results

Table A1: Summary of Expectations

Attribute	**Level**	**Physical Threat**	**Social Threat**
Demands	Improvement in maternal health	low	low
	Justice for domestic violence victims	low	moderate
	Reduced LGBTQ+ discrimination	low	high
	Improved abortion access	low	high
Gender Composition	Mostly women	low	moderate
	A mix of men and women	moderate	low
Leader Affiliation	Ties to political parties	low/moderate	low
	Ties to women's organizations	low	low/moderate
	Ties to an armed group	high	high
Tactics	Women banging pots	low	low
	Women disrupting traffic	moderate	moderate
	Women going topless	low	high
	Women throwing rocks	high	high

Table A2: Summary of results

Hypothesis	**Results**
H1. Compared to protests which demand improvements in maternal health care, protests which demand justice for victims of domestic violence will receive less support for police restraint in response.	No
H2. Compared to protests which demand improvements in maternal health care or justice for victims of domestic violence, protests which demand reductions in discrimination against LGBTQ+ individuals will receive less support for police restraint in response.	Yes (compared to maternal health); No (compared to DV justice)
H3. Compared to protests which demand improvements in maternal health care or justice for victims of domestic violence, protests which demand expansion of abortion access will receive less support for police restraint in response.	Yes (compared to maternal health); No (compared to DV justice)
H4a. Compared to protests made up of women, protests with a mix of men and women will receive less support for police restraint in response.	No
H4b. Compared to protests made up of women, protests with a mix of men and women will receive more support for police restraint in response.	No
H5a. Compared to protests in which leaders have ties to political parties, protests in which leaders have ties to women's organizations will receive more support for police restraint in response.	No
H5b. Compared to protests in which leaders have ties to political parties, protests in which leaders have ties to women's organizations will receive less support for police restraint in response	No
H6. Compared to protests in which leaders have ties to political parties or ties to women's organizations, protests in which leaders have ties to an armed group will receive less support for police restraint in response.	Yes
H7. Compared to protests in which women bang pots, protests in which women disrupt traffic will receive less support for police restraint in response.	Yes
H8. Compared to protests in which women bang pots, protests in which women go topless will receive less support for police restraint in response.	Yes
H9. Compared to protests in which bang pots, disrupt traffic, or go topless, protests in which women throw rocks will receive less support for police restraint in response.	Yes

B Additional Sampling Details

Block-size strata were defined with reference to the number of occupied dwellings (according to the 2018 census) in the blocks within a given locality; in other words, the cutoffs between the block-size strata varied by locality. The number of distinct block-size strata within each locality was determined by number of blocks we selected within that locality: if fewer than 10, 1 strata; if 10-19, 4 strata; if 20-49, 5 strata. We stratified by block size in an attempt to achieve socioeconomic representativeness. In Bogotá, wealthier residents live in

high-rises, and poorer residents live in buildings with fewer floors. As a result, relative to the percent of the population which they make up, richer residents are concentrated in a smaller number of blocks. Thus, randomly sampling blocks within each locality could have led us to under-sample wealthy residents and over-sample poorer residents.

Colombian energy bills typically list the socioeconomic level ("estrato") of buildings. Given that richer Colombians are less likely to answer surveys, the number of dwellings randomly selected per block varied by the socioeconomic level of the block: 8 households in socioeconomic levels 1-2, 10 households in socioeconomic level 3, and 12 households in socioeconomic levels 4-6. Following the beginning of data collection, we increased the number of dwellings selected per block in response to higher-than-anticipated rates of nonresponse to 10 in socioeconomic levels 1-2, 12 in socioeconomic level 3, and 14 in socioeconomic levels 4-6.

Individuals within homes were selected via a Bernoulli sampling process as follows: First, we defined the initial probability of inclusion, π, which took a value of .6 for men and .4 for women. Second, for each individual, there was random selection of a number from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1. If this number was less than π, then the individual was included in the sample. If more than one individual within a household was selected to be a part of the sample via this Bernoulli selection, the system would randomly select one of them to actually be surveyed.

Table A3: Anticipated Sample Size by Locality

Locality	**# Blocks**	**# Surveys**	**# Block-Size Stratas**
ANTONIO NARIÑO	9	36	1
BARRIOS UNIDOS	11	40	4
BOSA	17	68	4
CANDELARIA	9	36	1
CHAPINERO	10	40	4
CIUDAD BOLÍVAR	15	60	4
ENGATIVÁ	20	80	5
FONTIBÓN	13	52	4
KENNEDY	24	96	5
LOS MÁRTIRES	9	36	1
PUENTE ARANDA	11	44	4
RAFAEL URIBE URIBE	11	44	4
SAN CRISTÓBAL	11	44	4
SANTA FE	9	36	1
SUBA	28	112	5
TEUSAQUILLO	9	36	1
TUNJUELITO	9	36	1
USAQUÉN	15	60	4
USME	11	44	4

C Enumeration

We planned to replace blocks with other blocks in the same locality and the same block-size strata within that locality. However, during enumeration, we were facing a large volume of block-level rejection in which administrators of large apartment complexes refused to allow enumerators into the building. Given that wealthier residents live in high-rises in Colombia, we preferred to replace these blocks with large blocks in other localities than with small blocks in the same locality. Thus, we altered our replacement strategy so that, after a block replacement failed three times within the same locality and block-size strata, we allowed for replacement in a different locality randomly chosen from localities within the same geographic region of Bogotá. There are five such regions: North (Chapinero, Suba, Usaquén), West (Engativá, Fontibón, Kennedy), South (Bosa, Ciudad Bolívar, Rafael Uribe Uribe, Tunjuelita, Usme), East (Candelaria, San Cristóbal, Santa Fe), and Central (Antonio

Nariño, Barrios Unidos, Los Mártires, Puente Aranda, Teusaquillo).

Chapinero's final 17 surveys were finished in 1 newly selected block in Suba and 2 newly selected blocks in Usaquén; Fontibón's final 7 surveys were completed in 1 newly selected block in Engativá. Bosa and Tunjuelito's final 3 and 1 surveys, respectively, were completed in open blocks in Ciudad Bolívar; Los Mártires' final survey was completed in am open block in Teusaquillo; Puente Aranda's final 2 surveys were completed in open blocks in Antonio Nariño; Candelaria's final survey was completed in an open block in Santa Fe.

Table A4: Universe Versus Sample

	Bogotá	**Sample**
Woman	52.2% (2018)	54.0%
Afro	.9% (2018)	4.4%
Indigenous	.3% (2018)	2.6%
Electoral Participation 2022	65.5%	64.2%
Vote Petro 2022	58.6%	55.3%
Over 50 Years Old	13.2% (2018)	28.1%
Born in Bogotá	60.2% (2018)	57.6%

Table A5: Enumerated Sample

Locality	**Initial Blocks Selected**	**Replacement Blocks Selected**	**Respondents from Initial Blocks**	**Respondents From Replacement Blocks**	**% Anticipated Respondents**
ANTONIO NARIÑO	9	4	28	9	102.8
BARRIOS UNIDOS	11	4	26	14	100.0
BOSA	17	26	32	33	95.6
CANDELARIA	9	16	12	23	97.2
CHAPINERO	10	19	0	23	57.5
CIUDAD BOLÍVAR	15	1	64	0	105.0
ENGATIVÁ	20	30	37	51	110.0
FONTIBÓN	13	26	8	37	86.5
KENNEDY	24	46	30	66	100.0
LOS MÁRTIRES	9	18	8	27	97.2
PUENTE ARANDA	11	22	9	33	95.5
RAFAEL URIBE URIBE	11	0	44	0	100.0
SAN CRISÓBAL	11	7	32	12	100.0
SANTA FE	9	10	18	19	102.8
SUBA	28	40	59	62	108.0
TEUSAQUILLO	9	11	15	24	108.3
TUNJUELITO	9	2	24	11	100.0
USAQUÉN	15	25	33	36	110.0
USME	11	3	36	8	100.0

D Main Results

Table A6: AMCEs of Protest Attributes (Main Results)

	Approval "Stand Back"
Demands	
Improvement Maternal Health	
Justice for DV Victims	−0.116
	(0.081)
Reduced Discrimination Against LGBTQ+	−0.265***
	(0.079)
Improved Abortion Access	−0.200*
	(0.084)
Gender Composition	
Women	
Men and Women	−0.067
	(0.055)
Leader Affiliation	
Political Party	
Women's Organization	0.093
	(0.069)
Armed Group	−0.361***
	(0.070)
Tactics	
Banging Pots	
Disrupting Traffic	−0.677***
	(0.085)
Going Topless	−0.295***
	(0.079)
Throwing Rocks	−1.390***
	(0.088)
R^2	0.067
Num. obs.	6016

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\circ}p < 0.1$

Figure A1: AMCEs of Protest Attributes (Altered Baselines)



Table A7: AMCEs of Protest Attributes (Altered Baselines)

	Approval "Stand Back"
Demands	
Justice for DV Victims	
Reduced Discrimination Against LGBTQ+	-0.149°
	(0.080)
Improved Abortion Access	-0.085
	(0.080)
Improvement Maternal Health	0.116
	(0.081)
Gender Composition	
Women	
Men and Women	-0.067
	(0.055)
Leader Affiliation	
Women's Organization	
Armed Group	-0.454^{***}
	(0.071)
Political Party	-0.093
	(0.069)
Tactics	
Throwing Rocks	
Banging Pots	1.390^{***}
	(0.088)
Disrupting Traffic	0.713^{***}
	(0.083)
Going Topless	1.095^{***}
	(0.085)
R^2	0.067
Num. obs.	6016

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\circ}p < 0.1$

E Diagnostics & Robustness Tests

Figure A2: Marginal Means by Task



Table A8: Randomization Tests

	Woman	Age	Education	Race
(Intercept)	0.535***	44.885***	6.736***	2.778***
	(0.020)	(0.722)	(0.097)	(0.091)
Demands				
Improvement in Maternal Health				
Justice for DV Victims	0.024	0.880	0.069	−0.055
	(0.018)	(0.655)	(0.088)	(0.082)
Reduction Discrimination Against LGBT+	0.017	1.780**	−0.068	0.026
	(0.018)	(0.645)	(0.087)	(0.081)
Improved Abortion Access	0.013	0.611	0.049	−0.049
	(0.018)	(0.649)	(0.087)	(0.081)
Gender Composition				
Women				
Men and Women	0.008	−0.023	−0.009	−0.079
	(0.013)	(0.458)	(0.062)	(0.057)
Leader Affiliation				
Political Party				
Women's Organization	−0.036*	−0.129	0.037	−0.006
	(0.016)	(0.559)	(0.075)	(0.070)
Armed Group	−0.022	−0.719	0.133°	−0.046
	(0.016)	(0.560)	(0.075)	(0.070)
Tactics				
Banging Pots				
Disrupting Traffic	0.004	1.196°	−0.095	0.004
	(0.018)	(0.642)	(0.086)	(0.080)
Going Topless	0.006	0.518	−0.160°	0.028
	(0.018)	(0.650)	(0.088)	(0.081)
Throwing Rocks	0.017	1.534*	−0.039	−0.136°
	(0.018)	(0.643)	(0.087)	(0.081)
R^2	0.001	0.003	0.002	0.001
Adj. R^2	−0.000	0.001	0.000	−0.000
Num. obs.	6018	6018	6018	5970

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\circ}p < 0.1$

Figure A3: Results when Removing Respondents Enumerators Classified as Unengaged



Figure A4: Results with Weights



Figure A5: Results with Binary Dependent Variable



Table A9: Adjusted P-Values

Level	Original	Bonferroni	Benjamini-Hochberg	Adaptive Shrinkage
Justice Domestic Violence	0.154	2.467	0.198	0.368
Reduction Discrimination LGBTQ+	0.001	0.012	0.001	0.014
Access Abortion	0.018	0.281	0.026	0.087
Men and Women	0.219	3.506	0.219	0.447
Women's Organization	0.176	2.816	0.198	0.409
Armed Group	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Interrupting Traffic	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Topless	0.000	0.003	0.000	0.004
Throwing Rocks	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

F Heterogeneity

Table A10: Nested Forced Choice Model Comparison Test of Preference Heterogeneity

Comparison	**F Statistic**	**P Value**
Task	1.467	.018
Woman	2.122	0.020
Afro-Colombian	1.319	0.213
Indigenous	1.757	0.063
Victim State Violence	2.761	0.002
Victim Non-State Armed Group Violence	2.506	0.005
Left-wing/Right-wing	5.783	0.000
Left-wing/Centrist/Right-wing	6.415	0.000
Agreement, Women Can Only Realize Potential Via Motherhood	2.904	0.001
Agreement, Police Have Right to Demand Compliance with Law	11.182	0.000
Vote 2022 Election, Round 2	0.796	0.633
Agreement, Justice for DV Victims	3.681	0.000
Agreement, Reduced Discrimination Against LGBTQ+	11.799	0.000
Agreement, Improved Abortion Access	18.868	0.000

Figure A6: Marginal Means by Gender



Figure A7: Marginal Means by Victimization



Figure A8: Marginal Means by Ideology







Figure A9: Marginal Means by Victimization by Beliefs about Motherhood



Figure A10: Marginal Means by Beliefs about the Police



Figure A11: Marginal Means by Agreement with Demands (1 indicates "Agree" or "Completely Agree")







Figure A12: Marginal Means by Conjoint Attribute Levels



Table A11: T-tests, Difference B/tween MMs of Various Levels Among Subgroups

Subgroup	P-value Banging Pots vs Going Topless	P-value Maternal Health vs DV Victims	P-value Maternal Health vs LGBTQ+ Discrimination	P-value Maternal Health Abortion Access
Left (1-5)	.007	.8	.3	.7
Right (6-10)	.09	.3	.2	.04
Left (1-3)	.1	.07	1.0	.6
Centrist (4-7)	.02	.5	.2	.3
Right (8-10)	.1	.3	.2	.07
Left (1-4)	.1	.2	.7	1.0
Centrist (5-6)	.01	.6	.3	.5
Right (7-10)	.2	.4	.2	.06
Do Not Agree, Justice for DV Victims	.09			
Agree, Justice for DV Victims	.007			
Don't Agree, Reduced Discrimination Against LGBTQ+	.02			
Agree, Reduced Discrimination Against LGBTQ+	.05			
Don't Agree, Improved Access Abortion	.01			
Agree, Improved Access Abortion	.06			

G Violence, Success Extensions

Table A12: Results for Figure 2

	Successful	Violent
Demands		
Improvement in Maternal Health		
Justice for DV Victims	0.021	0.045
	(0.061)	(0.059)
Reduced Discrimination Against LGBTQ+	−0.027	0.040
	(0.062)	(0.059)
Improved Abortion Access	−0.095	0.081
	(0.062)	(0.059)
Gender Composition		
Women		
Men and Women	−0.004	0.111**
	(0.043)	(0.041)
Leader Affiliation		
Political Party		
Women's Organization	0.027	0.100*
	(0.053)	(0.050)
Armed Group	−0.030	0.184***
	(0.053)	(0.051)
Tactics		
Banging Pots		
Disrupting Traffic	−0.078	0.320***
	(0.062)	(0.059)
Going Topless	−0.052	0.033
	(0.060)	(0.057)
Throwing Rocks	−0.108°	0.766***
	(0.060)	(0.057)
R^2	0.008	0.206
Num. obs.	998	999

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\circ}p < 0.1$

Table A13: Heterogeneity in Perceptions of Protest by Ideology

	Successful	Violent
(Intercept)	1.668***	1.162***
	(0.090)	(0.087)
Demands		
Improvement in Maternal Health		
Justice for DV Victims	−0.011	0.040
	(0.084)	(0.081)
Reduced Discrimination Against LGBTQ+	0.050	−0.005
	(0.083)	(0.080)
Improved Abortion Access	−0.012	−0.009
	(0.083)	(0.080)
Gender Composition		
Women		
Men and Women	0.012	0.112°
	(0.059)	(0.057)
Leader Affiliation		
Political Party		
Women's Organization	0.048	0.144*
	(0.072)	(0.069)
Armed Group	−0.003	0.169*
	(0.075)	(0.072)
Tactics		
Banging Pots		
Disrupting Traffic	−0.027	0.368***
	(0.086)	(0.083)
Going Topless	−0.029	0.055
	(0.083)	(0.079)
Throwing Rocks	−0.074	0.817***
	(0.082)	(0.078)
Right	0.147	0.152
	(0.152)	(0.145)
Justice for DV Victims x Right	0.072	−0.061
	(0.135)	(0.129)
Reduced Discrimination Against LGBTQ+ x Right	−0.194	0.006
	(0.135)	(0.129)
Improved Abortion Access x Right	−0.208	0.220°
	(0.139)	(0.133)
Men and Women x Right	−0.012	0.004
	(0.095)	(0.091)
Women's Organization x Right	−0.042	−0.143
	(0.116)	(0.111)
Armed Group x Right	−0.080	0.035
	(0.118)	(0.113)
Disrupting Traffic x Right	−0.067	−0.109
	(0.139)	(0.133)
Going Topless x Right	0.010	−0.040
	(0.131)	(0.126)
Throwing Rocks x Right	−0.012	−0.093
	(0.131)	(0.126)
R^2	0.016	0.223
Adj. R^2	−0.006	0.206
Num. obs.	875	874

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{\circ}p < 0.1$